Independent Review of the value added of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) In Chad

28th November – 4th December 2010

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Executive Summary
At the request of the CERF Advisory Group (AG), the CERF Secretariat developed a draft Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF) in 2009 through close consultation with UN agencies, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other stakeholders. In July 2010, the CERF AG endorsed the draft PAF that includes, amongst other things, a mechanism for the independent review of the value added by the CERF to the humanitarian response in a country. Reviews are to be conducted annually in a sample of three to five countries. Following a pilot review of the added value of the CERF to humanitarian actions in Kenya using the PAF, three additional countries were selected to give further feedback on the systems and procedures used to access the CERF. This report using the PAF covers interviews and document reviews in Chad specifically for the period of 2009. Any additional points on the 2010 CERF applications have also been taken into account. It is worth noting that since its establishment in March 2006, the CERF has funded 100 projects in Chad totalling $60,514,421. During 2009, the CERF funded 20 projects in Chad amounting to $7,463,048 of which 14 were from the underfunded emergencies (UFE) window totalling $5,464,388 in mid-September with the remaining $1,998,660 from the rapid response (RR) window during May. During this time, the loan facility was not used.

Transparent and Inclusive Prioritisation and Decision making
The clusters do discuss the priorities and all relevant actors have the possibility of being included in this process through the ad-hoc CERF-related meetings and information-sharing arrangements through the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and Inter-Cluster Coordination (ICC) mechanism. Some clusters may be functioning better than others based on the amount of input which is given. It is felt that the level of participation and information-sharing by some cluster members is not optimal. The UN country team (UNCT) does discuss the CERF proposal but without an agreed country strategy it is difficult to tie any proposal to a clear and concise country objective for the UFE submission. In principle, the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) should constitute a strategic country plan. However, the comments by Heads of Agencies and the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) suggest this is just a compilation of Agency programmes without a structured approach. The same process is used for RR grants but the feeling from some members of the UN country team is that they are always running after situations and are not able to get ahead of situations with strategic planning. On this basis, if each agency comes to the table with a shopping list of needs and gets a percentage of what they are asking for there is a danger of inflated demands.

Coherent Country Submissions
The submission of CERF applications is guided by the RC/HC with support of the OCHA country office. The submission process in itself is transparent and inclusive of all humanitarian agencies at the country level. The submissions certainly adhere to the CERF life-saving criteria and other CERF guidelines, but the agreement process between the initial submission and the final submission can take some time (31 March to 29 May 2009 for UNHCR).

Streamlined Review, Allocations and Distribution
Review of the Value added of CERF in Chad

The Rapid Response window of the grant component was accessed by the UN country team in line with the criteria to promote early action and response to reduce loss of life and to enhance response to time-critical humanitarian requirements. The time between the final submission of the CERF grant request package from the RC/HC and the signature of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) was three days for the RR grants in May 2009. The most disturbing fact is the time it took from the date of the initial submission to the date of the final submission which was between 38 to 45 days. To support rapid response this is a very long negotiation period. The fastest process was achieved by WHO who after a final submission date of 19 May had their funding disbursed on 5 June.

The UN country team was also able to access the Underfunded Emergencies window in line with the criteria to strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises. However, the UFE decision took from 4 September until 17 September for one of the UNICEF applications. It would appear that this was held up to be signed at the same time as the rest of the grant proposals which were submitted on 8 September for FAO and 10 September for the other agency applications. All these applications being signed on 17 September means that UNICEF was waiting 13 days for the decision on their grant to give nutritional support for IDP and host populations in eastern Chad. In all honesty, this was not a great hurdle to UNICEF who was able to use other funds for the programme until the CERF funds were available, but is still a slow process. However, this remains an issue of concern as non-availability of other agency internal funds could have led to a later delivery of life saving interventions. The period from the date of the final submission to the disbursement of funds was between 20 and 25 days with the greatest amount of time being used UNFPA from 16 September until 5 October for the signing of the Letter of Understanding (LoU). The fastest process was achieved by WFP who had the funding disbursed on 5 October after a final submission date of the 10 September.

The difference between the grants from the rapid response window and the underfunded emergency window, even though they are covering similar activities, is that:

- Rapid Response has been for a new influx
- Underfunded emergency has been for an on-going crisis situation

**UN agency/IOM monitoring, reporting and Evaluation systems in place**

All CERF recipient agencies had their own standard internal monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place. Reports were submitted to the RC/HC through the OCHA country team who have a CERF focal point for this activity. The reports were not considered to be excessive as far as the amount of time required for completion or the amount of information required and useful in consolidating information. All agencies confirmed that this level of reporting should be maintained at this level.
Review of the Value added of CERF in Chad

The only agency who has carried out a review of their CERF grants and the process of submitting applications is FAO and they have shared their report with the CERF Secretariat.¹

**Life-saving activities supported**

The allocation of CERF grants was field driven and the prioritisation process did come from the clusters and the UN country team. With the RR application for the incoming refugees from the Central African Republic the support to

- protection and general assistance,
- primary health care,
- food,
- the reduction of gender based violence and
- an integrated emergency repose package,

seems logical and is in line with a standard approach to this type of situation.

The UFE grants, which were also refugee focussed, were to support agriculture, health, food and nutrition, education, WASH, protection and the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). The feeling from WFP was that the level of support to UNHAS was particularly low and not enough appreciation was given to the level of support this function gives to all programmes in a country with the logistical and security limitations of a country like Chad.

**Timely response**

The CERF RR grants in May were quite small when taking into account the amount of funding that the UN agencies had already received in the previous four months for their programmes in Chad. The CERF made six grants for five agencies totalling a little under $2 million against over $200 million already received. Although the majority of this $200 million was for WFP and for the crisis in the east of the country some funding could be used for the southern crisis as well. The added value of the CERF grants lay in them being focussed exclusively on the southern crisis and enabled UN Agencies to improve the levels of support available for new arrivals from the Central African Republic. During May when the rapid response grants were confirmed, a further $91 million was also received from other sources, although the vast majority of this was for WFP.

The CERF UFE grants in September of $5.46 million cannot really be said to fill a time critical gap as over $326 million had been received by the UN agencies by this stage. The revised CAP³ of 2009 shows a requirement for $399,923,376. By the end of August prior to the UFE grants allocation by CERF $384,230,560 had been received. Chad was to go on to receive a further $44.48 million giving them overall 111% coverage of their funding needs in principle. In reality, many sectors were under-funded and therefore the UFE grants gave good and timely support. During September, the CERF grants were a part of a total of $29 million contributed in that month with only a further $14.3 million being contributed during


² The information and much of the analysis in this paragraph is based on information from FTS, there is no way of knowing if it is complete or if the dates are actual. Consequently if the figures are wrong or incomplete then so will the analysis be wrong.

the last three months of the year. No contributions were recorded for UN agencies in Chad during November by the Financial Tracking Service (FTS).4

**Predictability and reliability enhanced**

Clearly the support from CERF is predictable when there is a new crisis and a rapid response is required. It is both predictable by the UN and some of the traditional donors, the latter not necessarily being a good thing as they take longer to respond requiring more information than they would have otherwise have needed. This could be viewed as a negative due to the slowdown of funding from donors who support not just the UN but also NGOs who are not supported by the CERF. In an interview ECHO indicated that they are influenced by CERF allocations and that the CERF is not stand-alone but a part of a portfolio of funding. Based on this predictability, planning and a rapid response to needs can be improved. However, as preparedness for new crises is not supported by CERF grants, planning of activities can be started but actions have to wait for funds to be allocated. In this situation, other donors need to be pressured more to fund preparedness measures.

**Quality Response**

A quality response is dependent on a whole range of factors and not just on the availability of CERF grants. The CAP gives the priorities as care and maintenance in difficult circumstances due to weather, distance and insecurity. However, many heads of agencies complain that the CAP is not strategic or focussed on longer term goals that the UN agencies can collectively work towards. Information is not always given freely in clusters by all participants which can make having a unified plan more difficult for the UN country team. The CERF does strengthen coordination amongst the UN agencies as it brings them together to discuss priorities for specific situations and to an extent in the clusters when an agency uses an NGO as a partner with a CERF grant. However, this is by no means entirely successful.

**Humanitarian reform process supported**

Having the decision-making role on CERF applications does reinforce the position of the RC/HC. But this also requires a strategic plan for a country to ensure a clearly established focus. In Chad, it is more difficult to say that the CERF strengthens clusters in a year such as 2009 when the percentage of funding from CERF grants was approximately 2.13 per cent for UN agencies. When NGO funding is taken into account then this percentage drops to 1.74 per cent of $428 million. UN Agencies do use information from clusters for support to their decision making process but they also have their own teams around the country in regional offices who also have an influence on priorities. Cluster leads do not force participants to come up with priorities for submissions as might be hoped.

**Rapid response**

Certainly the rapid response grants to support programmes for the refugee influx from the Central African Republic in the south of Chad were of assistance in what was a significant deterioration in an existing emergency. The majority of funding already given had gone to the eastern part of the country and so these grants helped reinforce systems to expand systems and support. Up to 60,000 refugees were already being supported, so this was a new

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4http://fts.unocha.org
influx created by an on-going problem and the funding was possibly less critical than it would have been in a completely new operation.

**Under-funded emergency**

These grants did help to ensure essential coverage of core humanitarian needs later in the year when other funding was drying up compared to the first part of the year. At the time of the grants’ allocation it could not be foreseen that the country appeal would be over 100% covered.

**Country level independent review of CERF**

The timing of the independent reviews of the value added by the CERF is critical to achieve the objectives as stated in the performance and accountability framework. It has to be as soon as possible after the end of the year to be reviewed prior to:

- the departure of the people involved in compiling the grant applications and
- before new events or crisis occur that can blur the memory of the people involved.

**Chad situation from the 2009 CHAP**

During 2009 the humanitarian crisis in Chad continued and was effected by:

- A degradation of the security situation in Sudan’s Darfur region,
- Persistent insecurity in the Central African Republic (CAR), and
- Increasing internal instability due to activities by armed groups and inter-ethnic tensions.

Since 2003 Chad had sheltered up to 265,000 Sudanese refugees in the East and approximately 58,000 Central African refugees in the South. Internal conflicts have caused the internal displacement of 180,000 Chadians in the East. The humanitarian needs had been increasing since 2006 but the delivery of assistance has been impeded by a deteriorating security situation.

In February 2008 rebels launched an attack on N’Djamena in an attempt to topple the regime of President Idriss Deby. Most humanitarian organisations working in Chad were evacuated, but humanitarian operations resumed in March and life-saving assistance was not interrupted. Tension with Sudan remained very high with strategic planning for further attacks in 2009. Banditry was an additional source of concern and insecurity particularly in the west and south.

During the first ten months of 2008 there were 124 security incidents against humanitarian organisations in the East, of which 47 were against UN agencies and 77 against NGOs. On 25 September 2007, UN Security Council resolution 1778 authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR. It was also foreseen that the UN would take over the role of European Union Force in Chad and CAR (EUFOR Chad/CAR) in 2009. Although insecurity meant that humanitarian actors had less access to beneficiaries in many areas, with occasions when operations had to be interrupted, humanitarian action had benefited over 500,000 people in 2008. Lives have been saved and the vulnerabilities of many have been reduced.
Review of the Value added of CERF in Chad

Humanitarian action during 2009 was to continue with a focus on emergency relief needs, emphasising self-sufficiency and developing the local capacities of all people affected by insecurity (internally displaced, refugees, and local populations). To implement these actions agencies were appealing for US$388,940,350 via the CAP5.

The mid-year review of the CAP on 21 June 2009 increased the funding requirements to $399,923,376 due to thousands of refugees from CAR crossing into the Salamat region of south-eastern Chad fleeing fighting between Government and armed opposition forces in northern CAR. Additionally, May saw continued fighting in eastern Chad between Government forces and Chadian armed opposition groups. The main differences that caused the increase lay in Multi-Sector Activities for IDPs and Refugees from CAR, up by close to $9.5 million. The appeal was covered to the level of $428,137,010 (111%) of which the UN received over $319 million in the first six months of the year. The UFE grants of $5,464,388 constituted 18.83% of the $29 million received by the UN during the last six months of the year. The rest, $79,410,770, went towards INGOs.

Value added of the CERF

The rapid response CERF allocations were for the increasing refugee population crossing from the Central African Republic to Daha in south-eastern Chad and the Salamat Region during the early part of the year. The funding added value the UN Agencies by allowing UN Agencies to respond to basic needs in the sectors of health, WASH, protection, food and nutrition. However, this was an influx of refugees to an ongoing refugee problem where activities were already underway in support programmes.

In 2010 due to the support of the CERF a fast and effective response to outbreaks of meningitis and measles during March and April and cholera in October was particularly effective and allowed UNICEF and WHO to save lives. The only other financial support for these health problems were two donations from ECHO totalling a little over $960,000. The CERF also provided a three months emergency response to more than 56,400 people suffering from malnutrition as well as supplying animal feed to about 22,780 pastoralists in the Sahel belt.

The underfunded CERF allocations in 2009 supported programmes of gender-based violence, WASH, health, nutrition and education for IDPs and host populations in eastern Chad. Additionally the humanitarian flights (UNHAS) which are fundamental to giving humanitarian organisations access to Sudanese refugees from the Darfur region of Sudan in eastern Chad and the CAR refugees in the south and south-east of Chad were supported. The acquisition of farming inputs was also supported for vulnerable households affected by conflicts and floods in Eastern and Southern Chad.

2009 totals of CERF allocations in Chad by UN Agency6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Agency</th>
<th>U/F</th>
<th>RR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
<td>$700,025</td>
<td>$112,000</td>
<td>$812,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
<td>$1,925,268</td>
<td>$363,800</td>
<td>$2,289,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Details from FTS
Review of the Value added of CERF in Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Total funding $</th>
<th>CERF $</th>
<th>Percentage from CERF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
<td>$593,098</td>
<td>$104,000</td>
<td>$697,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>$1,396,000</td>
<td>$746,860</td>
<td>$2,142,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
<td>$349,997</td>
<td>$672,000</td>
<td>$1,021,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5,464,388</td>
<td>$1,998,660</td>
<td>$7,463,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of funding from CERF against the total annual funding by Agency

Criteria for the allocation of CERF funding

The rapid response grants from the CERF in May were all for the on-going refugee situation in the southern part of Chad along the CAR border. An increase in violence in CAR pushed a further 60,000+ across the border. The focus was for humanitarian assistance, protection, primary health care, reproductive health, food and health and nutrition.

The Underfunded Emergencies window saw 11 grants in September for support to refugee programmes in eastern Chad, with one grant to UNHCR for the south-east refugee programme and one grant to UNHAS.

The allocations were requested on the basis of need with priorities indicated by the clusters and after a coordination meeting of the UN country team chaired by the RC/HC. The RC/HC rejected a request from WFP for support to the UN Humanitarian Air Service for the rapid response window on the grounds that it was not life-saving. However, this support was included in the UFE grants when UNHCR didn’t use its full funding allocation at that time.

The support to UNHAS is clearly life-saving as it allows for easy access by humanitarian workers to regions of Chad which are both time consuming and difficult to reach, particularly during the rainy season. There is a five-month period in Chad where WFP is required to preposition food for the refugees in eastern Chad as access for commercial vehicles is virtually impossible. UNHAS also reduces the security limitations that long distance driving across isolated areas brings in a country where banditry is widespread.

To ensure adherence to its mandated role the CERF defines “life-saving” by using the basic humanitarian principle of placing the people and communities affected in the focus and applying a rights-based approach traced back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular the right to life with dignity. In Chad it was felt that the criteria for eligibility of CERF funding was a little too loose as, life with dignity is not necessarily life-saving. All grants were as “life-saving” as could be expected and fitted the CERF criterion but many other people not supported by CERF grants could easily fit into life with dignity in a country like Chad.
Life with dignity as a concept created some discussions after it was bought up in the first interview of the three countries being covered by this evaluation as it is means something different in each country. Life with dignity needs to be related to the context of the country to ensure that life-saving is really effective life-saving. There is no suggestion that any of the interventions being supported by CERF grants are not life-saving as far as Chad is concerned.

**Recommendation**

The life-saving criteria for CERF applications should be reconsidered to include something on the context of the way people are living within any particular country or region. This may mean a slight tightening of the criteria to ensure that the term “dignity” is not exploited for funding which is not in reality “life-saving.” It is interesting to note that the CERF Two-Year evaluation recommended that the specific context should be considered when applying the life-saving criteria. But this is not clearly understood in all countries as the context of each country, unless clearly defined, will mean different things to different people.

**Timeliness of CERF funding**

All of the UN agencies interviewed were very happy with the speed with which CERF supported a rapid response when requested. This despite the period from 31 March until 19 May, (29 May for UNHCR) between the initial submission of a rapid response application and the final submission. It is not known if this delay lies with the Agencies requesting support who presumably know what they need as soon as their initial assessment is complete or with the CERF secretariat who know what they are prepared to fund. The reality is that for life-saving support it is too slow. The approval by the ERC on 22 May, (2 June for UNHCR) took just three days. Clearly, the CERF has quickly become indispensable in humanitarian response giving the agencies the ability to act more quickly.

A very positive epidemic response in early in 2010 which contributed to saving lives took just seven days from the initial submission until the signature of the ERC.

The system is light and user friendly so not difficult to access rapid response funds at a time when some donors have become more demanding.

**Inclusiveness and Transparency of the allocation process**

The decision to make a CERF funding application was taken by the RC/HC with Heads of agencies. However, there has been a frustrating level of difficulty in deciding priorities with no country-wide strategic planning. Due to this, all the agencies come to the table with a shopping list based on needs decided at the clusters. These needs are prioritised within a cluster but not between clusters. This is where a strategic plan in the CAP instead of an amalgamation of each Agencies funding needs would make the decision making process more easy for the UN country team. The feeling was that based on funds available a similar

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7CERF UFE is based on the CAP which is the most strategic planning document in CAP countries. The "shopping list comment is due to a lack of coordination of priorities between clusters. Prioritisation seems to be difficult because of the range of needs when CERF grant is low. The situation is not same in case of RR fund.
percentage is given to each agency taking into account what they asked for which encourages inflated demands.

There was concern that one system doesn’t fit all. A system that works for Sri Lanka or Columbia may not function well in Chad. The timing of underfunded emergency grants should take into account seasons and conditions that have an effect on programmes. This may be the case with some allocations but as yet not all:

- Chad is a land-locked country and procurement and importation of basic equipment and stocks takes time;
- Rainy seasons where travel is difficult or impossible;
- Distances over difficult terrain;
- Security needs;
- Planting and harvesting seasons;
- Seasonal disasters such as floods or epidemics which have an ongoing effect from the year before. (A good current example of this would be Pakistan following the 2010 floods, the water table in Sindh and Punjab is approximately three feet when it is normally 38 to 40 feet at this time of the year. Despite four months of temperatures that will go into the mid-forties the water table will not fall so far as to be able to absorb rainfall from even a moderate monsoon in July/August).

**Recommendation**

For the greatest effect the timing of UFE grants for any country should take into account seasons and conditions within that country to ensure that grants are arriving at the most appropriate time to have the desired impact. In addition, the UFE submission at the beginning of the year is particularly difficult as usually all or nearly all sectors are underfunded. At the moment the allocations are global and not on a country needs basis.

**Reporting and accountability**

Reporting is coordinated by a focal point in the OCHA office and was not considered to be a problem by the person who is responsible.

There are no separate monitoring or reporting systems for projects with CERF grants. They are covered by the UN agencies’ normal systems.

There were no meetings with the National Authorities as the available time was too short. No information was therefore available on the Government’s view of the actions being taken with CERF grants. This was not really surprising as with two days of public holidays during the review period all the meetings were held in a three-day period.

Interviews with NGOs who are implementing partners with various UN agencies indicated that the three-month period for the implementation was generally too short. It was acceptable if the grants were to purchase and distribute but for systems support, feeding centres, health support this was much more time sensitive.

All organisations and agencies indicated that the reporting needs were not difficult to comply with and ideally shouldn’t change.

**Recommendations**
The period for using rapid response funds should be extended to six months from the present three-month period. It is understood that this is already agreed and will happen in the near future.

The present reporting criteria are adequate as is and should not be changed in such a way as to require more time or information to compile it.

**Support to humanitarian reform and response**

The general feeling was that the role of the RC/HC with the UN country team in making final decisions on CERF applications does reinforce that position.

Clusters should be left to collectively decide priorities but the interaction between the clusters has to improve for this to be done well. Some NGOs come to take information, not often to share it, which doesn’t help the free flow of information and therefore the prioritisation of needs can be less certain than desired. The people with the role of cluster leads have a duel responsibility of representing their own agency as well as the cluster and are therefore at times put in a position of having to decide between which groupings to effectively represent. The cluster system should be reviewed and better guidelines established possibly with a separate position as a cluster coordinator as an independent position supported by the lead agency. Some clusters have sub-clusters which has led to extra meetings on sub-topics which has become more time consuming instead of dealing with all issues within the cluster. The feeling was that all topics should be dealt with in a full cluster meeting.

There are different systems for refugee programmes which often mean double the number of meetings covering the same sectoral topics. This was felt as unfortunate and that a way of reducing the duplication of meetings should be found.

**Additional issues**

**Other donors**

Some donors don’t react quickly to sudden onset emergencies as they are aware that the CERF will allocate funding. It was suggested that this may be the case with those who donate to the CERF. This therefore gives the requirement from other donors for more information before accessing funding later. Easy CERF grants therefore could translate into more difficult requirements for larger donations later. ECHO did indicate that they are influenced by CERF allocations and actively follow crises where CERF grants have been made.

There is a high level of interest in the CERF Secretariat to know if their grants are used by UN Agencies as leverage to assist with more funding from other donors. Using details of the 111 donations recorded by FTS to UN agencies during 2009 the analysis would suggest that this was not happening. The following table shows by month the number and the amounts of donations to all UN agencies with comments showing anything significant about the funding pattern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of Donations</th>
<th>Amount for the month</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$149,844,174</td>
<td>Included a donor non-specific carry over from WFP of over 50 million and a donation of over 60 million by the USA to WFP. Eight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Review of the Value added of CERF in Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Allocations</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$23,691,750</td>
<td>Included over $20 million from USA to UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$14,340,945</td>
<td>Seven donations to UNHCR and 6 donations by Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>$22,873,613</td>
<td>10 donations to WFP plus 13 to UNICEF. 11 of the donations were from the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$93,606,894</td>
<td>Six rapid response grants from CERF plus a single donation of over $86 million from the USA to WFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$15,349,451</td>
<td>Five of Seven donations to UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
<td>Three donations to UNHCR all from the USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$4,976,179</td>
<td>Five different donors, three of them to WFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$7,725,950</td>
<td>Included 13 grants from CERF from the under-funded emergencies window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$9,576,070</td>
<td>A mixture of donors with four for WFP and three for UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No activity reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$4,741,214</td>
<td>Four different donors, three on the last day of the month, three for UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funding by month throughout 2009 according to FTS

If the CERF was being used to leverage funds from other donors then more activity would have been expected in June and July following the rapid response grants and October and November using the Underfunded Emergencies grants. It could be argued that other donors may wish to wait and fund emergency response after the RR grant has been used. However, the RR grants do not cover 100 per cent of the needs of a response and more funding is required up front to keep the response rolling. As can be seen from the lack of use of the loan facility of CERF, disaster managers want to have the cash in the bank so that they can rely on it. Anecdotally, the fact that CERF has supported a response through either of the windows is seldom used as leverage with other donors.

Disaster Preparedness

CERF grants not being able to be used for disaster preparedness, risk reduction or mitigation was a cause for concern with some interviewees. Early warning systems in Chad could reduce the impact of various crises that occur and therefore have a life-saving element. There would be more time and funding to train people on how to respond more effectively. Logically, the more effective the capacity and capability in response the lower the costs of responding to
emergency situations will be. If funding was to be made available then possibly it could be negotiated with the Government to contribute in some way.

Another point of view was that disaster preparedness as a part of CERF would weaken the level of support that CERF is able to give at this time and that disaster preparedness should be supported by donors as a part of the annual plan.

**Recommendation**

A disaster preparedness element or window to reduce the impact of an impending disaster could be considered:

a. This would still be life-saving and could also be seen as saving livelihoods and therefore reduce the overall costs of humanitarian response and preventing loss of life.

b. This is where CERF could really be able to say that they are reinforcing capacity but this should not take the place of present capacity-building activities and only used at the time of an impending disaster.

**The Loan Facility**

The “Loan Facility” of $50 million has not been used globally since 2008, the original purpose of the loan facility was to provide bridge funding for cases where agencies had a pledge from a donors but disbursal had not yet taken place. Talking with operations managers they indicated that they would never use funds that they didn't have due to the possibility that donors could change their minds and not donate. This would then create funding problems that could last well into the next year. Therefore, in principle, operations managers do not start work without the assurance of having the funding in the bank. On this basis the loan facility would appear to be of little use and could be considered for alternative purposes.

**Recommendation**

The loan facility should be stopped and the funding made available for other purposes. This could be further support to either or both of the two windows of rapid response or underfunded emergencies.

**Training on the CERF systems**

CERF Secretariat training is good when and where it has been given but not enough of the front line UN agencies have staff who have benefited from this. The quality of initial CERF applications is often poor and not adequately focussed. Training could improve the level of these initial applications which would reduce the time required for the applications to be accepted. Training should be planned for the year and programme circulated to all UN agencies to propose their focal points for CERF. Priority should be given to UN Agencies in countries likely to use the system. This may already be done but not all people interviewed were aware of the training plan so when the training programme is given, negative applications should be requested from all agencies if they don’t wish to propose candidates.

Those trained from each country should give a presentation to CERF focal points in other Agencies.
Review of CERF funding
The review of CERF funding should be carried out as early as possible during the following year to ensure that the people involved during the year being reviewed are still available. Carrying out a review for 2009 during November and December of 2010 has undoubtedly missed the benefits of this institutional memory. The period of time for the review in any specific country is too short at six days with no field trips to meet people involved with field coordination, those involved with the implementation of programmes or to meet any beneficiaries. Ideally a period of eight days spread either side of a weekend would help to ensure that people with travel plans are more likely to be available for interview.

Recommendations
1. The life-saving criteria for CERF applications should be reconsidered to include something on the context of the way people are living within any particular country or regions. This may mean a slight tightening of the criteria to ensure that the term “dignity” is not exploited for funding which is not in reality “life-saving.” It is interesting to note that the CERF Two-Year Evaluation recommended that the specific context should be considered when applying the life-saving criteria.

2. The timing of UFE grants for any country should take into account seasons and conditions within that country to ensure that grants are arriving at the most appropriate time to have the desired impact.

3. The period for using rapid response funds should be extended to six months from the present three-month period. It is understood that this is already agreed and will happen in the near future.

4. The present reporting criteria is adequate as it is and should not be changed in such a way as to require more time or information to compile it.

5. A disaster preparedness element or window to reduce the impact of an impending disaster could be considered:
   a. This would still be life-saving and could also be seen as saving livelihoods and therefore reduce the overall costs of humanitarian response.
   b. This is where CERF could really be able to say that they are reinforcing capacity but this should not take the place of present capacity-building activities and only used at the time of an impending disaster.

6. The loan facility should be stopped and the funding made available for other purposes. This could be further support to either or both of the two windows of rapid response or underfunded emergencies.

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8Country to country the context of how people live is different and in some countries due to the levels of poverty and the effects of long term insecurity and war coping mechanisms are, or have become more fragile. The criteria for CERF grants should take this into account. At the time of the evaluation the Cholera outbreak was on-going in Haiti where many organisations were appealing for funds and declaring that the needed level of support was not available for life-saving. This clearly influenced some comments.
## People met in Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michele Falavigna</td>
<td>HC/Resident Coordinator</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Luc Siblot</td>
<td>Country Director and Representative</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamadou Dicko</td>
<td>Country Representative</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Baptiste Jean Pierre</td>
<td>Country Representative</td>
<td>WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Thomas Karengera</td>
<td>Head of Humanitarian Programmes</td>
<td>WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mira Gratier</td>
<td>Technical Assistant</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remy Courcier</td>
<td>Emergency Unit for Agriculture</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ute Kollies</td>
<td>Head of Office</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurent Uwumremyi</td>
<td>ACD Programs</td>
<td>CARE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Stefano Severe</td>
<td>Country Representative</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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<td>David Cibonga</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Office</td>
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<td>Madeleine Keitoro</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jean-Baptiste Ndjikumana</td>
<td>Deputy Representative</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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