Independent Review of the Value Added of CERF in Ethiopia 2011

Barnaby Willitts-King

Final report
17 September 2012
Executive Summary

CERF has contributed $144.5m to Ethiopia since its inception in 2006. Ethiopia is consistently in the top 3 recipients of CERF funding, and 2011 was no exception in responding to the drought affecting the Horn of Africa.

CERF plays an important role in Ethiopia, particularly in the close coordination with funding from the Humanitarian Response Fund also managed by OCHA. It is a major though not the largest donor in Ethiopia, and its importance increased in 2011. It adds value in terms of absolute availability of resources, filling gaps in time and in specific underfunded sectors. CERF responds in a timely manner, meeting PAF performance benchmarks.

CERF’s role in the 2011 drought response

The 2011 drought affected Ethiopia significantly but the response was more effective and timely than in other countries due to the firm foundation of government systems which could be used for early warning and to scale up responses. The humanitarian system provided important resources and expertise to the response – and CERF was particularly important in supporting key pipelines at crucial times, and underfunded sectors.

Ownership and inclusiveness

There are however low levels of ownership of CERF in Ethiopia since agencies see it as an entitlement, and it forms a relatively small part of some agencies’ resource mobilisation strategies. The merit-based allocation process has helped somewhat but there are limits to how far this is likely to change and OCHA has few additional levers. While the process of CERF allocation reflects priority needs and gaps, it is not as inclusive a process as envisaged in the CERF guidelines. There is however little appetite to integrate CERF more with the HRF, though good alignment occurs at a practical level and there are opportunities for further additional discussion in key fora.

**Recommendation 1:** OCHA Ethiopia should ensure that CERF processes are discussed in clusters, among cluster leads and by the EHCT, and that these discussions are explicitly connected to OCHA planning.

Strengthen regional coordination and CERF context awareness

Regional coordination has its limits due to country specifics, but more needs to be done, for example to strengthen cross-border early warning and information sharing. For the CERF specifically, for large crises there could be a benefit to more frequent short term deployments to support decision making in New York.

**Recommendation 2:** UN agencies should develop stronger regional coordination based on where this could add value to country responses

**Recommendation 3:** CERF Secretariat should continue to offer short term deployments/surge capacity to support regions/countries experiencing major
crises in order to strengthen context awareness and decision making in New York.

**Learning from merit-based approach**

The merit-based approach for allocating currently half of the under-funded grant is the foundation of a sound approach but there is room for further strengthening, particularly in terms of greater clarity and openness over the process and the rules.

**Recommendation 4:** OCHA Ethiopia should circulate and discuss draft protocols for the UFE merit-based approach.

**Streamlining review & strengthening proposals**

Increased scrutiny of proposal details was appropriate in terms of raising quality but agencies were not fully aware of specific policy changes.

**Recommendation 5:** CERF Secretariat should communicate via agency CERF focal points how much detail is expected in proposal narratives and the process for discussing proposals.

**Recommendation 6:** CERF should minimise the multiple rounds of ‘back and forth’ between New York and the country through strategic use of teleconferences to resolve issues which are often of perception relating to the country context

CERF training was valued and guidance was useful and appropriate, but for more experienced fund managers a forum for deeper discussion of strategic and programming issues would be valuable.

**Recommendation 7:** CERF Secretariat should explore annual advanced workshops for experienced CERF country focal points to create space for more strategic discussion than is possible in current CERF training. This could include how the life-saving criteria are applied, the role of the OCHA focal point, and details of under what circumstances re-programming and no-cost extensions are likely to be agreed.
# Table of Contents

Section 1: Introduction and context ........................................................................................................ 5  
  Ethiopia context ..................................................................................................................................... 5  
  Humanitarian response capacity and coordination ............................................................................... 7  
  Humanitarian funding .............................................................................................................................. 8  
  CERF funding ....................................................................................................................................... 11  
  Implementation channel ......................................................................................................................... 15  
Section 2: Added value of CERF in the drought response ....................................................................... 18  
  Underfunded sectors ............................................................................................................................... 19  
  Figure 12: Proportion of cluster funding received from CERF 2011 ..................................................... 19  
  Ownership ............................................................................................................................................. 20  
  Life saving criteria ................................................................................................................................. 21  
Section 3: Inclusiveness and transparency of the UFE allocation process ........................................... 22  
  Underfunded vs rapid response windows ............................................................................................. 23  
  Joint proposals ....................................................................................................................................... 24  
Section 4: Support to Humanitarian reform ....................................................................................... 25  
Section 5: Timeliness of CERF funding ................................................................................................ 26  
  Timeliness ............................................................................................................................................ 26  
  Speed of processes ............................................................................................................................... 26  
  No-cost extensions/reprogramming ..................................................................................................... 27  
Section 6: Reporting and accountability ............................................................................................. 29  
Section 7: Regional dimensions .......................................................................................................... 30  
Section 8: Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................................. 31  
  Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................ 31  
  Key issues and recommendations ......................................................................................................... 31  
Annex A: Study Terms of Reference .................................................................................................... 33  
Annex B: Interviewees ............................................................................................................................. 37  
Annex C: Project list ............................................................................................................................... 38  
Annex D: Humanitarian coordination structures .................................................................................. 39
Section 1: Introduction and context

1. This report is the main deliverable of an independent country-level review of the added value of CERF in Ethiopia, as part of the CERF Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF). It forms part of the regional review of the added value of CERF in responding to the Horn of Africa crisis in 2011 also covering Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia (TORs at Annex A).

2. Its primary scope is 2011 but prior years and the ongoing 2012 underfunded round will also be discussed where relevant, particularly in the context of an ongoing, chronic crisis. The previous PAF review of Ethiopia will be used as a key reference, and this report will review progress in the year since that report was researched (Mowjee 2011). This review is distinct from the regular PAF review carried out of Ethiopia by focusing on 2011 as an acute period of an ongoing crisis, and explicitly considering the regional aspects of CERF by analysing it in the four affected countries in the Horn of Africa.

3. It is based on a visit to Ethiopia from May 5-17 2012 which included semi-structured interviews in the capital with UN agencies, international NGOs present in-country and government authorities. Field visits were undertaken to Ethiopia’s Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR) and refugee areas of Dollo Ado in Somali Region near the Somali border to observe completed CERF projects and discuss with project teams, beneficiaries and local authorities (see Annex B for list of interviewed organisations).

4. The approach followed a standard question list for PAF review, discussed with the CERF Secretariat. The visit was complemented and informed by a desk review of reports, project proposals and correspondence relating to Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa crisis and CERF more broadly. Preliminary findings and recommendations were presented to the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team on May 17, 2012. The reviewer is very grateful to OCHA for their support of the mission, as well as all those interviewed and WFP and UNHCR for arranging the field visits.

5. This report aims to give a concise overview of the key value added and lessons learned from CERF in Ethiopia in 2011. Further details on context and process can be found in the 2011 PAF report on Ethiopia.

Ethiopia context

6. Ethiopia is a complex humanitarian environment. It is a populous, landlocked country (82 million population according to World Bank 2010), with a diverse range of agro-ecological zones and livelihoods (Figure 1). Economic growth has been strong in recent years (7.5% in 2011), and politically the country has been stable under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

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1 Ethiopia was selected for a regular PAF country level review in 2011; the review report is available at cerf.un.org
2 Mr Zenawi passed away on 20 August 2012; the implications were unclear at the time of finalising this report
7. Humanitarian needs stem from longstanding pockets of chronic food insecurity and the conflicts and drought affecting its neighbours – Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan. High levels of chronic vulnerability are found, with a high incidence of natural hazards. Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain tense. Ethiopia’s armed forces are present in Somalia. In 2011 drought impacted countries across the Horn of Africa. In addition to growing levels of acute food insecurity within the country, Ethiopia witnessed a massive increase in the number of Somalis fleeing drought and conflict for Ethiopia. Some 98,000 Somalis entered Ethiopia in 2011; the country now hosts over 211,000 Somali refugees and over 160,000 refugees from other countries. The IASC real-time evaluation of the 2011 drought response in Ethiopia found that the response saved lives but not livelihoods (VALID 2012).

8. According to the IASC RTE, in Ethiopia, the failure of the rains and the ensuing drought manifested itself in three distinct ways:

* First, the impact of three successive rain failures in the southern lowlands on pastoral and agro-pastoral communities was complex...
* Secondly, the failure of the short Belg rains in the traditionally food insecure, southern highlands, led to many people losing their main crops, putting vulnerable families under huge stress
* Thirdly, the same rain failures in Somalia (in contiguous areas across the national frontier) led – with the further complication of the escalation of Somalia’s insurgency –
to famine and the mass movement of the population. Many of these found sanctuary in Ethiopia as refugees.

9. These three impacts, plus Ethiopia's far higher population density, meant that the country registered the largest number of people affected (4.8 million) of the four countries in the Horn of Africa regional appeal. This was, however, marginally fewer people than in 2010.

10. Ethiopia's relief needs have fluctuated between two and seven million beneficiaries since the middle of the first decade of the century (with the exception of 2007). In 2011 the figures rose from 2.8m people in February to 3.1m in April and finally to 4.8m in July. (VALID 2012).

11. The Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD) is the authoritative international ‘appeal’ published by the Government of Ethiopia, which sets out figures for Ethiopian beneficiaries, on top of which refugee caseloads need to be factored in. There is no CAP. This reflects the close control the Government exerts over humanitarian operations in the country. Agencies are only permitted to support populations within the parameters of government approved figures. The Government operates a ‘Productive Safety Net Programme’ (PSNP) which uses cash and food for work/public works to operate as a more sustainable response to chronic food insecurity. The Government of Ethiopia also operates a system of relief distribution for the transiently food insecure, implemented through WFP, DRMFS and the JEOP.

12. In general there is a view from UN agencies that the HRD underestimates humanitarian needs, since the Government, and some regions such as Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR) in particular, do not want to create a perception of crisis against the ‘good news’ of economic growth and development. UN agencies and NGOs are viewed as exaggerating needs in order to sustain their own ‘businesses’. The Government has increasingly clamped down on NGO operations with a 2010 CSO law that has restricted the activities of national NGOs and made it more challenging for international NGOs to operate.

**Humanitarian response capacity and coordination**

13. There is significant humanitarian response capacity both through the government systems such as PSNP, which can be scaled up in a crisis, as well as UN and NGOs on a large scale. There are approximately 100 national and international NGOs, UN and Red Cross agencies participating in coordinated humanitarian response.

14. Humanitarian coordination structures - relevant for CERF as the key inputs to CERF decisions - are the HCT, the Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) review board, the Cluster Leads and the clusters/sectors themselves. Annex D has further details of Ethiopia’s coordination structures.

15. The monthly Humanitarian Country Team meeting is chaired by the HC and comprises heads of UN humanitarian agencies, four NGO reps elected by the HINGO (humanitarian international NGOs) umbrella group, and donor reps (currently DFID, USAID/OFDA and ECHO).
16. OCHA chairs the Cluster Leads Coordination Meeting, which meets every two weeks to discuss key issues, priorities and gaps. The Cluster Approach has been locally adapted to the Ethiopian context, with Cluster Leads supporting government-led sectoral task forces to plan and coordinate emergency response. The extent to which the adapted Cluster Approach is fully integrated into government-led structures varies. For example the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU), which is part of the government, coordinates monitoring of and response to nutrition crises, with the coordinator's role filled by a UNICEF-seconded staff based in the DRMFSS. The head of ENCU is also the nutrition cluster lead and participates in cluster coordination meetings. FAO jointly chairs the Agriculture and Livelihood working group with the Ministry of Agriculture. Not all clusters are as integrated with the government sector taskforces.

17. The government-led coordination system overlays the humanitarian system. The SMAC – Strategic Multi-Agency Coordination committee - is a ministerial level coordination body in which the EHCT has participated since mid-2011. The TMAC is the technical group of sectoral taskforce leads supporting the SMAC, which includes ministry technical focal points and cluster leads. Cross-government coordination occurs in the framework of disaster risk management, responsibility for which currently sits in the Ministry of Agriculture.

**Humanitarian funding**

18. This section looks at humanitarian funding to Ethiopia and puts CERF in the context of other funding channels. Most of the analysis relies on reporting to the OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS), which relies on agency and donor reporting. It is sufficiently reliable to make broad conclusions, but not infallible. In particular, analysis of refugee funding is difficult due to the absence of a clear data category for refugee support, UNHCR's global funding arrangements, and because the refugee response is planned, implemented and monitored separately from humanitarian response in Ethiopia. Reporting on implementation channels – such as government or NGOs – relies on agency reporting through the HC’s annual report. This data has only recently started to be reported and may not be wholly reliable as well as not giving information on actual implementation rates.

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3 The Multi-sector category is traditionally understood to be the refugee sector but analysis of projects coded as multi-sector shows significant numbers of non-refugee projects, and many refugee projects are coded under the specific sector rather than multi-sector
19. Humanitarian funding has been contributed to Ethiopia in relatively large but varying amounts, as shown in figure 2. 2011 was the second highest year after 2008, totalling over $800m of contributions, reflecting the severity of the drought crisis.
Timing of funding flows

Figure 3: 2011 Non-CERF, HRF donor commitments by month/US$m

Figure 4: 2011 CERF and HRF commitments 2011 by month/US$m
20. Figures 3 and 4 shows a number of things. Firstly they highlight the relatively modest part that CERF plays in Ethiopia. Secondly while the HRF provided inputs on a monthly basis, greater in the months of April-September when needs were greatest, CERF funds have a different timing profile. They provide an important early input in March and are then clustered in July to September – coinciding with the upturn in donor contributions found across the Horn of Africa. In Ethiopia overall the response was earlier than elsewhere in the Horn.

CERF funding

21. Ethiopia has received $144.5m in CERF funding since 2006, the fifth largest recipient. Ethiopia was the second largest recipient of CERF funding in 2011, receiving a total of $46.5m – almost equally from the rapid response and underfunded windows, as detailed in Table 1. Ethiopia received 2 underfunded and 2 rapid response allocations in 2011 (project details in Annex C).

Table 1: CERF funding breakdown for 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Window</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>$11m</td>
<td>HRD</td>
<td>Underfunded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>$14.6m</td>
<td>SNNPR drought</td>
<td>Rapid response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>$10m</td>
<td>Somali refugees</td>
<td>Rapid response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>$11m</td>
<td>Oromiya drought and Eritrean refugees</td>
<td>Underfunded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$46.6m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. CERF provided 5% of all humanitarian funding reported to FTS for Ethiopia in 2011. This made it the fifth largest donor after the US, UK, ECHO and the HRF (see Figure 4 – HRF reported as ERF). This was a spike over 2010 when CERF provided 2.7% of humanitarian funding reported to FTS for Ethiopia.

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4 FTS data attribute contributions to the HRF to the donor while also listing the HRF as a donor. To avoid double counting, a correction is applied in the data but this is visualised in charts in this section. Both are included for the purpose of illustrating relative importance of donors, but this does double-count DFID's contribution to the HRF, for example.
23. The Humanitarian Response Fund is a large Emergency Response Fund managed by OCHA in-country, which disburses primarily to NGOs and is managed by the same team as CERF. It is a well established fund with a strong track record. In 2011 the HRF disbursed a similar amount as CERF – over $52m, through 75 grants to UN and NGOs, for an annual pooled fund total spend of almost $100m. This was a significant increase on previous years in which the combined HRF/CERF spend was more in the region of $40-50m.

24. HRF donors are illustrated in Figure 5, showing a very different profile from overall funding, with a predominance of European donors apart from ECHO, dominated by the UK.

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5 FTS data attribute contributions to the HRF to the donor while also listing the HRF as a donor. To avoid double counting, a correction is applied in the data but this is visualised in charts in this section. Both are included for the purpose of illustrating relative importance of donors.
Figure 5: Donors to Ethiopia HRF 2011

Table 2: CERF and HRF funding 2006-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CERF UFE</th>
<th>CERF RR</th>
<th>HRF allocations/$m</th>
<th>Total humanitarian funding/$m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>393.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>276.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>1,077.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>707.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>616.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>826.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6: Funding trends to Ethiopia 2006-2011

![Funding trends to Ethiopia 2006-2011](image)

Note: Total humanitarian funding is reduced by a factor of 10 to illustrate relative trends.

25. Table 2 and Figure 6 show the relative contributions of the two CERF windows and the HRF since 2006. This shows an increasing level of UFE funding (though this is less in 2012), while RR funding is accessed in particularly serious crisis years. The HRF mirrors overall funding trends closely.

26. Taking food out of the analysis, given its dominance of the response, shows that the HRF is a more important non-food donor than CERF (see Figure 7). Together, the HRF and CERF are almost as large a non-food donor as the largest donor, the USA, contributing 18% of the non-food response in 2011.
Figure 7: Breakdown of $346m non-food (CAP and non-CAP) humanitarian contributions to Ethiopia 2011

Implementation channel

27. CERF projects are implemented mainly through government partners – almost half of funds are spent through the government compared to just 6% through NGOs (see chart).6

Figure 8: Implementation channel of CERF funding

From HC’s Annual Report on CERF Ethiopia, 2011

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6 These figures are derived from the HC’s Annual Report. The CERF Advisory Group paper prepared in May 2012 has the figure of 11% for government implementation – the difference being food is included in the 47% figure. All figures for implementation channels should be treated with caution as the accuracy and consistency is not reliable.
28. The high proportion of sums spent through government compared to NGOs reflects government implementation capacity in Ethiopia, as well as the degree to which government controls the humanitarian response.

Figure 9: CERF funding 2011 by UN agency

29. The bulk of funds in 2011 went to WFP and UNICEF, much of which was for key pipelines for supplementary and therapeutic foodstuffs. About one-sixth of funding went to UNHCR, reflecting the many refugee crises in Ethiopia.

30. The extent to which UN agencies rely on CERF for emergency programming varies, which may partly explain the lack of agency engagement (see Figure 10). This is based on FTS figures and shows the degree to which emergency programming as reported to FTS relies on CERF funding – but this does not take into account emergency response staff being funded from other sources.
31. The HRF, by contrast, emphasises NGOs which received 59% of 2011 HRF disbursements, as shown in Figure 11.
Section 2: Added value of CERF in the drought response

32. CERF added value to the 2011 Horn of Africa response in the same ways as identified in the PAF review of Ethiopia in 2010, i.e.:

- By filling funding gaps
- By providing funding early in the year
- By complementing the HRF
- By enabling agencies to leverage funding from other donors
- By supporting a response capacity
- As a straightforward funding mechanism

33. In 2011 particular value was added in filling funding gaps and responding to the rapidly worsening situation. This was appropriate given the scale of the operation, and the allocations were generally agreed to have corresponded to priority needs. Responses were generally for scaling up existing projects rather than starting new projects with new partners.

34. The first response through the underfunded window in April was an early contribution to underfunded needs identified in the HRD, supporting notably the WFP TSF pipeline that was facing a pipeline break.

35. Rapid response allocations in July and September responded respectively to increases in the beneficiary figures approved by the government as a result of the impact of the drought in SNNPR through the WFP general food pipeline and UNICEF RUTF; and to support new Somali refugees arriving in the Dollo Ado region through WFP and UNHCR.

36. The underfunded allocation later in September responded to the needs emerging from drought in Oromiya region – again including the WFP TSF pipeline - and to Eritrean refugees.

37. There was a significant carry-over from 2011 to 2012 - $208m of the 2011 contributions of $822m (see table 3). This might indicate that it was inappropriate for the UFE to support Ethiopia, as CERF funds could not be programmed within 2011. However the reasons for such carry over relate to the timing of the crisis response and the increasing response after the declaration of famine in Somalia in July 2011 – leading to considerable donor funds, including towards the end of the year. The bulk of the carry over was due to WFP general food pipeline, which needs to have a degree of carry over to be sustained as a pipeline, but carry-over was also substantial in other sectors.

Table 3: Carry over from 2011 to 2012 (Ethiopia Humanitarian Requirements Document January 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Ration:</td>
<td>281,521,240</td>
<td>159,220,600</td>
<td>122,300,640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Supplementary

(EOS/TSF) Food:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Funding 1</th>
<th>Funding 2</th>
<th>Funding 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOOD SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>292,813,432</td>
<td>183,865,257</td>
<td>122,300,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Nutrition</td>
<td>24,831,453</td>
<td>11,325,296</td>
<td>13,506,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>23,572,168</td>
<td>11,212,172</td>
<td>12,359,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>15,455,453</td>
<td>1,375,356</td>
<td>14,080,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Food Total</td>
<td>70,359,074</td>
<td>23,912,824</td>
<td>46,446,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>363,172,506</td>
<td>207,778081</td>
<td>168,746,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Underfunded sectors

Figure 12: Proportion of cluster funding received from CERF 2011

![Chart showing percentages of funding]

38. Figure 12 shows the proportion of funding per cluster received from CERF in 2011. This illustrates the importance of CERF to sectors traditionally underfunded in Ethiopia, particularly education, agriculture and multi-sector (primarily refugees but this category is unreliable and neither comprehensive nor consistent). UNFPA also relies wholly on CERF funding for its emergency programme, as a small agency with limited humanitarian fundraising capacity for responding to gender-based violence and reproductive health needs in emergencies. WHO also relies on CERF for its emergency programme. While food is still the major sector (45% of CERF funding), non-food sectors receive over half the CERF funding, in particular health and multi-sector.
39. The funding to refugees (multi-sector) appears significant, suggesting that CERF is a major donor to refugees in Ethiopia – particularly for Eritrean refugees. However further analysis of funding data shows that UNHCR funding is under-reported through the multi-sector category, and the analysis in section 1 shows UNHCR only received 10% of its funds from CERF in 2011. However interviews with donors suggest UNHCR’s global funding model – where a minimum operating level of funds is provided from Geneva - has the unintended consequence of making donors reluctant to fund UNHCR at country level since fungibility and the lack of transparency in UNHCR resource mobilisation means any earmarked contributions will just be used to reduce the amount that is received from Geneva rather than increasing the resources available in Ethiopia. This also creates few incentives for UNHCR to fundraise in-country.

Ownership

40. CERF is both a large and a small part of the Ethiopia funding picture. It provides significant funds as the fifth largest donor. However its relatively small size (5% of humanitarian funds contributed for Ethiopia for 2011, but usually around 2%), and low level of pass through to NGOs - 6% compared to 47% for government, means it has low levels of ownership and struggles to compete for attention from stakeholders. This includes OCHA – which is much more focused on managing the HRF; from the larger UN agencies for which it is usually a small source of funding (apart from the 2011 spike), albeit one that is factored in to annual planning for resource mobilization (perhaps with too much of an entitlement expectation compared to other donors, though the merit-based selection system has helped to some extent); and from NGOs for whom the HRF is the major donor. The government is aware of but not involved in CERF decision making beyond its role in leading the sector taskforces and coordinating the overall response

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7 As discussed above, these figures are tentative and the conclusions that are drawn should be seen as preliminary and provisional
and appeal development, which supports generation of priorities. On the other hand CERF together with the HRF amounted to a significant proportion of non-food funding and CERF is a major funding source for smaller and underfunded agencies such as UNFPA and WHO, and sectors such as agriculture, health and education.

**Life saving criteria**

41. The CERF life saving criteria have been adhered to for CERF projects in 2011. Partners working on livelihoods were the most critical of the strict adherence to the life-saving criteria, which were seen as restricting the opportunities to address underlying causes and better prepare for or mitigate future risks.

42. However CERF funding has not been overly strict, showing some flexibility to reflect the chronic nature of the crisis in Ethiopia. For example the FAO/UNDP/OPM livelihood/DRM underfunded project contains elements which are life-saving but linked to mitigation as an additional benefit. This is appropriate, as is considering ‘early response’ to likely refugee influxes by increasing camp capacity – as is occurring in Dollo Ado with discussions about opening a sixth camp.
Section 3: Inclusiveness and transparency of the UFE allocation process

43. The CERF allocation process in Ethiopia is less explicitly inclusive and transparent than what is recommended in CERF guidance, but as discussed above, allocations have been appropriate and generally supported by agencies. This occurs because the strong OCHA office is generally seen as having a good overview of priority needs, and agencies are more prepared to trust it and allow it to manage the process than in other countries. NGOs are involved but have a very minor stake in the process as the HRF is their key pooled fund donor. Their main input is through the EHCT and involvement on the UFE merit-based panel.

44. CERF decisions are based on indirect rather than direct inputs from the humanitarian coordination structures including the EHCT, HRF review board and clusters/sectors through the Cluster Leads (see Annex D for schematic of different coordination structures). By indirect, the review means - based on interviews and review of meeting minutes – that the fund is not discussed extensively or explicitly in terms of an open discussion of where the funds should be allocated – but the allocations are closely informed by a good awareness of gaps and priorities. For example, the EHCT is expected to endorse the strategies/priorities and process proposed by the HC. The Cluster Leads are most closely involved in the analysis of priorities for funding but the process is carefully managed by OCHA to avoid confrontation or turf wars. For the underfunded window there was more discussion in terms of identifying underfunded areas – and through the merit-based/competitive system – but for the rapid response window there was little open discussion.

45. The process is less open and inclusive than it might theoretically be – and as envisaged in CERF guidelines - because with tacit agency consent the strong OCHA office aims to use CERF strategically and as a rapidly accessible resource with minimal layers of consultation. There are risks to such a system. It is less accountable and relies on a strong OCHA office and engaged HC. However there is little appetite to institutionalize CERF further among the UN agencies, although donors would welcome greater integration with the HRF as long as the HRF was not weakened as a result. An obvious route would be through a greater role for the HRF review board. This is an established, well functioning entity with a similar mandate. Previous reports have recommended its involvement, and it was more deeply involved in previous years (for example through assessing merit-based applications).

46. However, as well as concerns that this could slow down CERF granting, there is a widely held view that increasing the role of the HRF review board or Cluster Leads in CERF would risk unsettling the healthy balance of relationships between UN agencies and with OCHA; as well as complexities due to applicants being on the Review Board. This would also be the case if the OCHA country office became more forceful in critiquing inappropriate proposals; with an underlying concern that CERF should never undermine the strong trust that the HRF has built with all partners.

47. CERF benefits from a strong HRF as the OCHA team managing both has a good sense of priorities and gaps, good relationships with bilateral donors, and a political sense of how to balance different agency interests. There is also significant complementarity between CERF and HRF. For example the refugee rapid response allocation in early 2012 saw CERF funding food and the HRF funding non-food aspects of
the response. The two funding channels were looked at together to ensure a coherent response. This is the default approach which was also followed in 2011.

48. During the drought response in 2011 particularly, key bilateral donors liaised with the HRF team as an important donor through frequent formal and informal meetings in order to coordinate analysis of priorities and gaps, and ensure adequate coverage. Major bilateral donors interviewed regard the HRF team, and OCHA Ethiopia, as a strong and professional team with extensive experience. CERF was seen as playing an important role in complementing other donor funds – particularly in providing rapid and appropriate funds to UN agencies, and in complementing the HRF.

49. While generally allocations are appropriate, there was a perception that funding to WHO in 2012 for meningitis response was based on a need for political balance between UN agencies and avoiding conflict rather than it being a pressing priority with an agency track record of implementation capacity.

**Underfunded vs rapid response windows**

50. The two windows are rightly perceived as serving different purposes in Ethiopia and are programmed as such. The underfunded window specifically focused on areas where there were critical funding gaps, while the rapid response related to rapidly changing situations. In some cases either window would have been applicable, but the process for deciding the allocation varied, with the UFE window being more inclusive.

51. The most inclusive process in 2011 was also the most innovative – the merit-based allocation system for the underfunded round. Driven by the HC’s desire to increase the quality of proposals and move away from an entitlement perspective where agencies planned on regular UFE funding, half of allocated UFE funds were decided competitively/on-merit based on proposals submitted by agencies rather than accepted for the CERF submission if they are in line with agreed strategy. The EHCT approved but had little discussion on overall strategy for the UFE (or indeed RR) allocation. The Cluster Leads provided primary analysis on the non-competitive priorities – including pipelines – and were instrumental in developing the strategic priorities for the competitive process (Oromiya/Eritrean refugees). The ICWG then agreed criteria for their analysis by an independent review board, separate and unlinked to the HRF Review Board. After criticism of the 2010 UFE review board, which was not seen as adequately reflecting the range of cluster interests, and containing under-qualified members, Cluster Leads were each invited to nominate one member of the independent review board. However the process was perceived as being together very rapidly with little consultation and while OCHA was clear they were representing the clusters’ interests, Review Board members themselves were not consistent in their understanding of their role was – were they advocating for the cluster, the lead agency, or acting as an independent voice? That said, many months had passed since the process occurred so this may have contributed to a less clear sense of the role.

52. While the agencies continue to be critical of the existence of the merit-based system, and of specific ways in which the decisions were made and communicated by the review board, there is some evidence that the process has increased agency ownership and marginally improved proposal quality. Greater focus needs to be made on an orderly process with clear criteria agreed sufficiently in advance with wide buy-in.
53. Part of the issue is that the large size of organisations, and rapid staff turnover, in Ethiopia leads to communication gaps within as well as between organisations – the minutes of the Cluster Leads and EHCT meetings are quite transparent about much of the process that some respondents felt was opaque, but specific individuals may not have been involved in such discussions or seen the minutes.

**Joint proposals**

54. The second underfunded round responding to drought in Oromiya elicited joint proposals from FAO/IOM/UNDP for emergency response with an element of livelihood recovery and disaster risk management, and WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA for health. This was encouraged by the HC and fostered closer working between agencies but it is not clear how far this extended beyond proposal writing into implementation.
Section 4: Support to Humanitarian reform

55. CERF is an integral part of the logic of humanitarian reform, and strengthens the HC and clusters, according to most interviewees. For the HC particularly, CERF is a tangible resource over which he can direct considerable influence. However it would be an overstatement to suggest that CERF plays a major part in supporting humanitarian reform, and as discussed in Section 3, its role is complex in terms of the impact on clusters. The simple mathematics of the proportion of the response funded by CERF serves to highlight how much weight it carries with agencies, with interviews confirming this. There is however variation by sector, as CERF plays a more important part in some sectors.

56. The fairly hands-off involvement of coordination structures such as the clusters and EHCT also would suggest a limited degree to which they are supported or strengthened by CERF.

57. That said, there is no doubt that without CERF, they would be weaker institutions. So while the direct added value of CERF is on the funding side, there are some spin-off, less direct benefits to the wider humanitarian system.
Section 5: Timeliness of CERF funding

Timeliness

58. Evaluations such as the Somalia and Ethiopia RTE, and reports from NGOs describe different reasons for the late arrival of funding in response to the drought of 2011 – for which early warning systems had generally triggered by March/April 2011, or even earlier – December 2010 - in some cases but major funds did not begin to be disbursed until the declaration of famine in Somalia in July 2011.8

59. In Ethiopia, however, the dynamic is very different from Somalia due to the diametrically opposite role of the government. Here there were clear signs from assessments that beneficiary numbers needed to be revised upwards in March from the original HRD 2011 issued in early February and based on an assessment conducted in December 2010. At both regional (i.e. sub-national) and national level, draft assessment results indicated significant rises in food insecurity due to drought and knock-on livelihood impacts (e.g. for daily labourers dependent on coffee harvest). However political expediency, such as in Southern Nations region (SNNPR) led to draft beneficiary figures being hugely reduced – through wildly over-optimistic estimates of forecast production figures.

60. Despite pressure from the HCT and federal ministries, the SNNPR figure was maintained until the July revision of the HRD, by which point malnutrition in the region was spiking (as a result of insufficient food availability earlier in the year). WFP had received rapid response funding by this stage for its estimated figures (475,000 in SNNPR) which allowed it to keep the pipeline flowing. When beneficiary figures were increased to better – but not entirely - reflect the reality that most people were expecting, and fearing, the demand for additional resources was suddenly enormous. Here CERF had played a crucial role – not in responding directly to changing needs, but in changing political prioritisation of needs.

61. A key question is therefore whether CERF was, or could have been any more timely than other donors. In this respect the limitation placed by the government left the UN with few options, but a number of interviewees felt that the CERF rapid response could have been requested earlier. This would also have been an opportunity to signal the UN’s concern about the situation in Ethiopia – particularly in terms of the refugee response, which was initially poor and understaffed (Ethiopia RTE, Valid 2012). Given the challenge of working with government figures, there could be an advantage to making a smaller contribution with a provisional increase agreed subject to figures being finalised.

Speed of processes

62. While CERF is seen as fast, agencies commented that it is becoming a more demanding donor than in the past without the reasons for this being communicated. While CERF is still a comparatively ‘light’ donor in terms of bureaucratic requirements, some agencies had some concerns about how far this process might go.

8 ‘A Dangerous Delay, The cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa’. Joint Briefing by Oxfam and Save the Children, Jan 2012
63. Discussions suggest the changes are real, and partly a function of CERF maturing and its place in the donor ecosystem become established, and of CERF Secretariat getting its systems in place and being able to focus on more detailed examination of proposals, as well as responding the overall global donor focus on accountability; and resulting from findings and recommendations of the CERF 5 Year Evaluation. However there needs to be a strategic discussion about the approach to certain aspects where there is room for interpretation such as no-cost extensions, to develop a common understanding.

64. This is a process donors go through in terms of sending signals to recipients how rigorously they are being appraised, balanced with bureaucratic rules, and the need for speed and a recognition of how large a ‘share’ of an agency the donor represents and therefore how appropriate/possible it is for the donor to exercise leverage. Larger funds bring greater scrutiny and greater possible leverage in general.

65. These are typically different perceptions of donors and recipients: donors seeing recipients as playing fast and loose when they would see it as responding to changing situations, and recipients seeing donors being overly bureaucratic & risk averse when they would see it as imposing rigour and adhering to high standards.

66. While there is clearly room for agency improvement – in terms of proposal quality, better planning, and more aggressive resource mobilisation, it is clear that the Ethiopian context is very challenging as it is so dependent on government beneficiary figures which are politically manipulated by under-capacity government and regional bodies. There was a concern from OCHA Ethiopia that the CERF Secretariat had insufficient awareness of the Ethiopia context to appraise the finer points of proposals and reprogramming requests.

67. **Recommendation:** CERF should minimise the multiple rounds of ‘back and forth’ between New York and the country through strategic use of teleconferences to resolve issues which are often of perception relating to the country context.

68. There is a challenge in terms of OCHA capacity for supporting CERF in Ethiopia that the HRF team has a busy week by week process for handling HRF review and board meetings. The CERF process is by contrast ‘lumpy’ in the sense that long stretches can go by with very little CERF administration, then intense activity with short deadlines – which can be disruptive to other work processes. The surge support to the underfunded round in 2011 was hugely appreciated as the office was very busy – but created a few challenges in terms of continuity/consistency as the process was very much handled by the officer on surge. In general CERF is seen as slightly outside the regular work of the HRF section, rather than an integrated part of it.

**No-cost extensions/reprogramming**

69. Implementation rates as measured by the number of no-cost extensions suggest that projects are being implemented satisfactorily in terms of transfers to partners. However it is not possible to establish the degree of implementation by government due to reporting and monitoring delays. There were two NCE requests in 2011 relating to the SNNPR rapid response grants.
70. The UNICEF rapid response project for SNNPR requested a no-cost extension and reprogramming as the agreed budget over-estimated monitoring and quality assurance costs, and monitoring was delayed by local government capacity constraints. Essentially this meant funds were un-utilised which ultimately were returned to CERF rather than used for monitoring in other regions. UNICEF Ethiopia felt this was unusual behaviour for a donor when there were other priority unmet needs which were consistent with the agreed proposal. However CERF’s case was that the original RR grant was for SNNPR and funds should not be used, even if the priorities and gaps in the country had shifted in the six months since the original proposal.

71. By contrast the WFP RR grant was based on assessed numbers which were eventually only partially approved by the government in the revised HRD in 2011. This led to a reprogramming request to use the additional resources for the CSB/pulse pipeline for Oromiya, which by that point underfunded – and continued to be so, shown by the UFE grant later in the year. While the reasons are logical, there were felt to be inconsistencies with the UNICEF decision, the main difference being UNICEF had overbudgeted line items whereas WFP’s change was due to the changing government figures. This is however consistent with CERF guidance on reprogramming of funds in which “external circumstances affecting project implementation” can justify ERC approval for programming changes.

72. While this was a specific example highlighted, OCHA Ethiopia felt current guidance was insufficiently clear on reprogramming and no-cost extensions and merited further hands-on workshop discussion to develop a shared understanding of the strategic approach to no-cost extensions and reprogramming.
Section 6: Reporting and accountability

73. The lack of ownership of CERF has knock-on effects on the smoothness of the reporting cycle. Inputs from agencies to OCHA for the HC’s annual report were late and incomplete. OCHA feels in a weak position to chase agencies, and agencies do not place a high priority on CERF reporting. By comparison, the local ownership of the HRF gives OCHA greater influence over agencies and a better record on reporting.

74. The HC’s Annual report as a whole is not particularly strategic, and does not reflect some of the positive aspects of the process including the joint planning process. The process had been planned to more consultative and discursive, but late submissions reduced the time available for this. Similarly there was specific review of CERF progress during the year – mainly due to competing demands from responding to the crisis. HRF mechanisms of monitoring and reporting are not explicitly linked to CERF processes.

75. There was little follow-up in Ethiopia on the findings and recommendations of the PAF report in 2011. While it was circulated by OCHA, there was no discussion or process to take forward its recommendations and respondents even within OCHA were not familiar with the report. This appears to have been the intention, but operational priorities intervened, as well as reflecting the low levels of ownership by the EHCT, the priority given to the HRF, and the strength of the OCHA country office in deciding its own direction. It does indicate a weakness in the PAF country review process in terms of uptake in-country, suggesting the process either needs mandatory follow-up in-country, perhaps through a management response to the PAF; or an explicit – but ultimately less useful - approach that the PAF country reviews are primarily focused on informing the CERF Secretariat and Advisory Group rather than influencing country level behaviour.
Section 7: Regional dimensions

76. Despite significant regional aspects in terms of cross-border movements and economies, and political/military dynamics in the region, humanitarian programming is very much focused on the country level. While beyond the scope of CERF and relating more to the architecture of the humanitarian system, deep regional analysis, contingency planning and programming are not evident. Institutionally agencies and the system find it difficult to establish cross-border monitoring, information sharing and programming. Better early warning and pre-emption of cross-border flows would help with programming and camp planning.

77. That said there are limits to the degree of regional approaches. The countries are very different. Ethiopia has a strong, assertive government which keeps very close control of humanitarian activities. By contrast in Somalia the UN operates very much independent of government and authorities. Sensitivities about sovereignty and security make governments cautious about cross-border activities.

78. Further use could be made of regional bodies such as IGAD, the African Union, and a regional Humanitarian Coordinator – as appointed to the Sahel crisis in 2012 – would provide opportunities to focus on practical regional steps. However in the Sahel the affected countries are more similar than those in the Horn of Africa and fewer of them have existing HCs and humanitarian country operations. There is a perception in Ethiopia that the ‘Nairobi nexus’ of regional offices as well as Kenya and Somalia country offices makes regional coordination revolve around those two countries, while Ethiopia’s specific characteristics make it hard to bring into regional approaches.

79. In terms of CERF programming, the regional scale of the crisis, and some of the nuanced contextual issues might argue for greater use of surge capacity either from the region or headquarters regional presence for a short period to better work with OCHA offices and UN agencies. The risk here would be to create an additional layer on top of the CERF Secretariat in New York, adding time without value, as well as a parallel layer to the OCHA regional office.
Conclusions

80. As found in the 2011 PAF review of Ethiopia, CERF plays an important role in Ethiopia, particularly in the close coordination with HRF funding. It adds value in terms of absolute availability of resources, filling gaps in time and in specific underfunded sectors. CERF responds in a timely manner, meeting PAF performance benchmarks.

_CERF’s role in the 2011 drought response_

81. The 2011 drought affected Ethiopia significantly but the response was more effective and timely than in other countries due to the firm foundation of government systems which could be used for early warning and to scale up responses. The humanitarian system provided important resources and expertise to the response – and CERF was particularly important in supporting key pipelines at crucial times, and underfunded sectors.

Key issues and recommendations

_Ownership and inclusiveness_

82. There are however low levels of ownership of CERF in Ethiopia since agencies see it as an entitlement, and it forms a relatively small part of some agencies’ resource mobilisation strategies. The merit-based allocation process has helped somewhat but there are limits to how far this is likely to change and OCHA has few additional levers. While the process of CERF allocation reflects priority needs and gaps, it is not as inclusive a process as envisaged in CERF guidelines. There is however little appetite to integrate CERF more with the HRF, though good alignment occurs at a practical level and there are opportunities for further additional discussion in key fora.

**Recommendation 1:** OCHA Ethiopia should ensure that CERF processes are discussed in clusters, among cluster leads and by the EHCT, and that these discussions are explicitly connected to OCHA planning.

_Strengthen regional coordination and CERF context awareness_

83. Regional coordination has its limits due to country specifics, but more needs to be done, for example to strengthen cross-border early warning and information sharing. For CERF specifically, for large crises there could be a benefit to more frequent short term deployments to support decision making in New York.

**Recommendation 2:** UN agencies should develop stronger regional coordination based on where this could add value to country responses

**Recommendation 3:** CERF Secretariat should continue to offer short term deployments/surge capacity to support regions/countries experiencing major crises in order to strengthen context awareness and decision making in New York.

_Learning from merit-based approach_
84. The merit-based approach for allocating currently half of the under-funded grant is the foundation of a sound approach but there is room for further strengthening, particularly in terms of greater clarity and openness over the process and the rules.

**Recommendation 4:** OCHA Ethiopia should circulate and discuss draft protocols for the UFE merit-based approach.

*Streamlining review & strengthening proposals*

85. Increased scrutiny of proposal details was appropriate in terms of raising quality but agencies were not fully aware of specific policy changes.

**Recommendation 5:** CERF Secretariat should communicate via agency CERF focal points how much detail is expected in proposal narratives and the process for discussing proposals.

**Recommendation 6:** CERF should minimise the multiple rounds of ‘back and forth’ between New York and the country through strategic use of teleconferences to resolve issues which are often of perception relating to the country context.

86. CERF training was valued and guidance was useful and appropriate, but for more experienced fund managers a forum for deeper discussion of strategic and programming issues would be valuable.

**Recommendation 7:** CERF Secretariat should explore annual advanced workshops for experienced CERF country focal points to create space for more strategic discussion than is possible in current CERF training. This could include how the life-saving criteria are applied, the role of the OCHA focal point, and details of under what circumstances re-programming and no-cost extensions are likely to be agreed.
Annex A: Study Terms of Reference

INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE VALUE ADDED OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (CERF) IN ETHIOPIA AND DJIBOUTI

Terms of Reference

1. Background to the CERF and Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF)

It is widely recognized that the key strengths of the CERF lie in its ability to respond quickly and in the relatively high degree of flexibility it affords users compared with other sources of humanitarian funding. Member States and private donors require appropriate assurances that the considerable funds involved are managed appropriately and meaningful results are being achieved. The ERC function is charged with a formal fiduciary responsibility over the proper use of CERF funds, and relies upon the CERF Secretariat to assist with the proper discharge of these responsibilities. In this context, the development of a PAF for the CERF is regarded as an effective tool.

Paragraph 19 of General Assembly Resolution 60/124 calls for “the establishment of an appropriate reporting and accountability mechanism to ensure that the funds allocated through the Fund are used in the most efficient, effective and transparent manner possible.” Consequently, the CERF Advisory Group at its meeting on 12 October 2006 called for the development of a Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF). In addition, the 2008 CERF Two-year Evaluation gave as Key Recommendation 4: “The multiple lines of accountability for CERF need to be clarified, in consultation with the UN Controller and the operational agencies, to specify the roles of each actor.” In response, the CERF Secretariat worked on developing a PAF, a first draft was circulated in 2009 and a PAF adopted in 2010.

The CERF PAF proposes, among other things, the introduction of independent reviews to be conducted annually within a sample of three to five countries as determined by the ERC. The CERF Advisory Group supported the inclusion of such an independent country-level mechanism. Following a pilot review conducted in Kenya in early 2010, the CERF AG met on 1 July and endorsed the PAF. Further studies took place in late 2010 in Chad, Mauritania and Sri Lanka and in 2011 in Colombia, Bolivia, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.

2. Scope and Purpose

The main purpose of the present country-level reviews will be to assess the value added of CERF operations in Ethiopia and Djibouti during 2011 in the context of the overall CERF support to the Horn of Africa drought response. The reviews will also look at prioritization exercises in 2012 to the extent possible.

A major aim of the review will be to provide the ERC with an appropriate level of assurance around the achievement of key performance benchmarks and planned results for the CERF mechanism. The review will also include recommendations aimed at improving operational aspects of the CERF and may also identify relevant policy issues which need to be addressed at a global level.
3. Key issues

The critical overriding question on which assurance is sought by the ERC is: Have CERF operations in the country successfully added value to the broader humanitarian endeavor?

Using the PAF indicator sets, assurances will be sought around the following specific broad areas of concern to the ERC:

1. CERF processes are achieving key management benchmarks in that:
   - CERF submissions are based on an inclusive planning process and adhere to established quality criteria.
   - Transparent systems are in place for correct allocation, efficient flow and use of CERF by agencies.
   - Adequate monitoring and evaluation systems are in place at the agency level for measuring and reporting on results.

2. There are reasonable grounds to believe that CERF operations favour the following results:
   - CERF consolidates humanitarian reform by empowering the RC/HC and enhancing the quality of coordination within the cluster approach and across clusters.
   - CERF facilitates adequate coverage, eliminates gaps and facilitates an effective division of labour among humanitarian (especially smaller) actors.
   - CERF contributes to a more timely response to needs.
   - CERF favors the delivery of relevant life-saving actions at critical moments.

4. Review Methodology

During the PAF development process, UN agencies emphasized that the formal assessment of agency performance vis-à-vis CERF-funded activities remains the prerogative of recipient agencies via their own internal oversight procedures (internal performance reporting, audit and evaluation etc.). The review approach will therefore be designed in a manner which avoids duplication with such procedures and meets only the immediate assurance needs of the ERC in relation to the PAF.

Recognizing that CERF funds are often co-mingled with other donor funds by agencies and that the in-depth assessment of beneficiary-level impact is formally the charge of recipient agencies, the review will not attempt to link beneficiary-level changes to CERF activity, except where recipient agencies already have this data. The review mechanism will not seek to provide comprehensive coverage linked to detailed narratives and contextual analysis around how and why results are being achieved. Rather it will focus instead on providing an assurance around issues of the Fund’s operational impact.

Key components of the methodology will include a rapid desk review and field visits by the consultant to Ethiopia and Djibouti, including interviews with key stakeholders. The analytical approach will be deliberately kept rapid and light.

Prior to leaving each country, the Consultant will leave with the RC/HC a short analytical report consisting of a series of short observations and recommendations in relation to the key assurance issues identified above. The RC/HC, together with the HCT, will subsequently be requested to provide a “management response” to the recommendations contained in the report.
Desk review: A quantitative analysis will be conducted on the data, reports and files available at the HQ and Country level. These include:

- Funding data, including funding from sources other than the CERF (e.g. OCHA’s Financial Tracking System);
- Timelines on sums requested, allocated from CERF database;
- CERF country-level reports on context, needs, status of implementation, activities, results and lessons learned;
- CERF meeting minutes at HQ and country-level and notifications of application decisions;
- CERF Project files at HQ and country-level.

Semi-structured interviews at country level will include: RC/HC, Cluster leads, Heads of Agencies, I/NGO partner implementing CERF projects and those without access to CERF funds, host government, donors. Interviews will also take place with selected CERF Secretariat staff to get further background and perspective. UN Agencies and IOM will be asked to provide relevant documents and indicate interview partners to facilitate the review.

Select project site visits: These may be included as appropriate and time permitting to help provide some limited anecdotal information regarding the use of funding at the affected population level and can provide a field-level snapshot and some direct contact with affected populations.

In-Country briefings will be used as learning opportunities to discuss and validate the findings, explore possible recommendations and further refine the analytical approaches.

5. Proposed Consultants

It is anticipated that one consultant will be required to prepare the reviews for Ethiopia and Djibouti. The consultant will be independent and he/she has not been previously involved with any aspects of the country-level operations being reviewed. He/she should have the following skills:

- Expertise in UN humanitarian reform & financing and knowledge of the CAP and Flash Appeal process;
- Expertise and extensive experience in humanitarian evaluation;
- Expertise in analyzing financial data in tandem with other types of information;
- Expertise in project management and implementation;
- Knowledge, including field experience with a broad range of humanitarian actors, such as UN agencies, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, local government disaster response structures and systems, and NGOs;
- Fluency in written and spoken English
- Familiarity with complex emergency and natural disaster settings.

6. Management and Support

The review will be managed by the CERF Secretariat, who will identify country-level focal points to support the review mission. Their responsibilities will include:

- Provide necessary administrative, coordination and logistical support to the consultants;
- Facilitate the consultants’ access to specific information or expertise necessary to perform the assessment;
- Monitor and assess the quality of the review and its process;
• Ensure sufficient engagement by UNCT on initial findings prior to dissemination;
• When appropriate, recommend approval of final report;
• Disseminate final report; and
• Facilitate management response to the final report and subsequent follow up.

7. Deliverables

The main output will be two concise country reports in English to the ERC, through the CERF Secretariat, of no more than 20 pages each (excluding appendices) in an electronic version plus an Executive Summary (up to two pages). The consultant will also prepare a brief synthesis report placing the country findings in the context of the overall CERF response to the Horn of Africa drought. The reports will be structured in the form of short observations and conclusions around the different assurance concerns linked to the PAF. The reports will include, as appropriate, a set of specific, well targeted and action-oriented recommendations whose purpose should be to improve the performance of the CERF within the country or raising any policy issues. The annexes will include a brief description of the methods used and the tests performed and a list of persons interviewed.
Annex B: Interviewees

Representatives were interviewed from the following organisations:

UNICEF
UNDP
OCHA
RC/HC Office
WHO
FAO
WFP
UNFPA
UNHCR
IOM
HINGOs
IRC
ICWG
DFID
USAID/OFDA
ECHO
Government of Ethiopia: Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector,
Authorities in SNNPR and Dollo Ado
Annex C: Project list

### Rapid response funding to Ethiopia 2011 (July, Sept)

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<th>Amount/$US</th>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>Food assistance to refugees hosted in Ethiopia</td>
<td>5,299,620</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Emergency Response and assistance to Somali refugees</td>
<td>4,601,991</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>Integrated measles and nutrition response</td>
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<td>Emergency Nutrition Response</td>
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### Underfunded window grants to Ethiopia 2011 (March, Sept)

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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Control of communicable diseases, major childhood illnesses and provision of emergency reproductive health services in Oromia</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Control of communicable diseases, major childhood illnesses and provision of emergency reproductive health services in Oromia</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Emergency Support to Drought Affected Pastoral Agro-Pastoral Communities in Borena Zone, Oromiya Region, Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Enhanced Outreach Strategy (EOS) for Child Survival in drought-affected districts of Oromia, SNNP and Somali regions</td>
<td>1,125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Emergency Drought Response</td>
<td>1,124,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Response to infectious disease outbreaks in humanitarian crisis</td>
<td>898,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Basic Education in Emergencies</td>
<td>499,949</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Targeted Supplementary Food component of PRRO 10665 Responding to Humanitarian Crises and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity</td>
<td>4,049,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Emergency livelihood support to La Niña affected pastoral communities in eastern and southern Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Management of AWD and Meningitis outbreaks</td>
<td>599,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Multi-Sector Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Ethiopia</td>
<td>749,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Development of water supply system in Adi Harush Refugee Camp</td>
<td>599,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>21,975,663</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex D: Humanitarian coordination structures
(source: OCHA)
Can I recommend to include an annex that does two things:

1. Introduce all the different entities (ICWG, EHCT, SMAC/TMAC, Clusters, OCHA HRF Unit, OCHA, HRF Review Board, UFE review board, HC)
2. Present a table with the various coordination groups as rows and the CERF RR, CERF UFE and HRF as columns, with each field in the table briefly highlighting the group's role in the respective process.

Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC): Chaired by DRMFSS, open to STF chairs only: coordinates federal response on the government side

DRM Technical Working Group: Chaired by DRMFSS, membership open to line ministries, UN, NGOs and donors

- Methodology Sub Working Group, Logistics Sub Working Group and HRD Editorial Committee: as sub-groups of the DRMTWG, each works on a technical aspect of preparation of the biannual national needs assessments and related HRDs
- DRR Sub Working Group: New, its TORs are being developed
- Emergency Task Forces (Including Drought, Floods and Gambella): Like the DRMTWG that they fall under, ETFs are chaired by DRMFSS and open to membership by line ministries. UN, NGOs and donors; ETFs are established/reactivated for key crises that require a multi-sectoral response

Sectoral Task Forces (STFs)
- Each STF is chaired by the relevant line ministry and supported/co-chaired by a cluster lead from the international community
- Membership open to all agencies working in the sector at the technical level
- STFs are responsible for formulating sector strategies and response plans and coordinating sector response at federal and state levels
- Through the relevant cluster lead, the STFs are also responsible for performing the technical review of HRF projects in the sector

Regional / Local Authorities
- Within each region (and usually within woredas and at lower levels), the counterparts to the relevant line ministry (i.e. Ministry of Health – Regional Health Bureau) and DRMFSS (Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureaus, DPPBs)
- Responsible for coordinating response within sectors at the regional and lower levels, but needs to be formalized, regularized and strengthened

Humanitarian Coordination Architecture in Ethiopia

Humanitarian Policy Dialogue
- Co-chaired by the State Minister/DRMFSS and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), with secretarial support of DRMFSS and OCHA
- Quarterly forum that brings together representatives of the EHCT, DRMFSS and Line Ministries to discuss key strategic issues

Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT)
- Chaired by the HC and comprised of UN agencies, NGO representatives, donor representatives and Red Cross Movement
- EHCT sets humanitarian strategy, policy and advocacy priorities

Inter-Cluster Coordination (Cluster Leads Meeting)
- Convened and chaired by OCHA, comprising working level representatives from each cluster lead agency
- Inter-sectoral coordination on the international side; discusses strategic issues
- Includes representation from clusters / working groups that have no national STF counterparts (i.e. Protection)
- Should be operational counterpart to EHCT, but information sharing and accountability mechanisms require strengthening

Humanitarian Community Coordination
- Information sharing platform open to all partners

Regional Coordination Teams
- Comprising UN and NGOs represented at regional and lower levels, informal groups work to streamline response through inter-sectoral and sectoral coordination

Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF)
- Managed by OCHA on behalf of the HC, HRF is a pooled fund accessible by UN and international NGOs
- Technical review done by cluster leads/STFs; overall project review and recommendation to HC done by Review Board
- Largest source of non-food humanitarian financing in Ethiopia, able to fund sectors not covered by HRP
- Liaises regularly (formally and informally) with its donors, as well as non-HRF donors (OFDA, ECHO) to enhance complementarity

Humanitarian International NGO Group (HINGO)
- Inter-NGO coordination mechanism comprising national and international NGOs
- Elected Steering Committee represents the NGO community on the EHCT

Development Assistance Group
- Main development partner group in Ethiopia; has its own coordination mechanisms
- Three DAG representatives (ECHO, USAID/OFDA and DFID sit on EHCT